The Atlantic Council:

Banafsheh Keynoush is a foreign affairs scholar. She is also the author of Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?

During 2013, Iran seized on a rare opportunity to talk directly with the United States for a new round of nuclear negotiations. European countries speaking at the time to Iran to cap its nuclear program asked the US, which had been part of the nuclear talks since 2006, to join in fresh discussions with Iran. The P5+1 talks that followed between Iran and the US—along with Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia—came with a promise that the countries would not tighten the multilateral sanctions regime against Tehran if an agreement was reached. The arrangement led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Iran was enticing the US to talk once again this past month, by withdrawing some of its obligations under the nuclear deal in May. The two countries had a falling out after US President Donald Trump pulled out of the JCPOA, and re-imposed punitive sanctions on Tehran. To trigger Washington into some action to end this impasse, on May 22, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reached out to the US by suggesting that engaging in a new round of talks was possible—if they returned to the table.

Reaching out to Washington was facilitated when tensions between Iran and some US allies in the Persian Gulf mounted in May, following attacks on four oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and a Saudi oil pipeline by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. After the attacks, Tehran accelerated plans suggesting it was open to fresh talks with the US even on its foreign policy, by proposing a non-aggression pact with US Arab allies.

Tehran’s proposal for a regional pact comes at an opportune time. Experience tells Iran that if it wants to negotiate with the US, it has to run the show with its Gulf Arab neighbors. This is not always easy to achieve, given the June 14 attack on two oil tankers in the Persian Gulf which Iran calls “suspicious” but is blamed for by the US and Saudi Arabia. By aiming to de-escalate regional tensions after the Gulf attacks, Iran is hoping to build a buffer between itself and its Arab neighbors to keep them hopeful with a promise of a pact, to then reach out directly to the United States. The tactic has partially worked for now because Iran’s Arab neighbors have conveyto German leaders touring the region that they do not seek to escalate tensions with Iran.

Even during the P5+1 talks, Iran recognized that talking with the US could throw water over agitations by Arab neighbors concerned with Tehran’s nuclear program. The Obama administration danced the dance with Iran, keeping countries like Saudi Arabia that had far deeper misgivings about Iran’s nuclear ambitions at arm’s length throughout the nuclear negotiations.

Back then, Iran also opted out the idea of discussing anything except its nuclear program with the United States, which shelved other differences including Iran’s growing regional influence and ballistic missile program. Some in Iran preferred a so-called “grand bargain” with the US that would have involved additional discussions on all issues that divided the two countries. But in conversations this author has had with an advisor to President Rouhani a year before the nuclear deal was concluded, it appeared that a “grand bargain” with the US, though desirable, would face multiple regional hurdles along the way if Iran’s Arab neighbors were to offer an endless list of grievances. Iran’s highest authorities decided to discuss with the US only what seemed to be the most negotiable item at the time: its nuclear program.

Since then, many have believed that a successful nuclear agreement would lead to Iran’s change of behavior in the region. But Tehran has never altered its foreign policy goals, unless it receives incentives to moderate some in a manner that ensures Iranian power and regional influence. 

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